**DEUTSCHE FLUGDIENSTBERATER VEREINIGUNG E. V.**
**GERMAN AIR LINE DISPATCHERS ASSOCIATION**

Sitz: Frankfurt/Main / Amtsgericht Frankfurt/Main 73 VR 6038

Member of EUFALDA and IFALDA

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An alle Mitglieder

Datum / Date 10.03.2006

Sehr geehrte Mitglieder,

als neuer 1. Vorsitzender der Deutschen Flugdienstberater Vereinigung e.V. erhalten Sie heute von mir das Protokoll von der diesjährigen Jahreshauptversammlung vom 02.03.2006.

Als Highlight gab es dieses Mal neben den Neuwahlen des Vorstandes auch wieder zwei Fachvorträge. Zum einen war dies ein Kollege der Vereinigung Cockpit mit einem Vortrag über den A380, zum zweiten gab es ein Vortrag zu dem Service und den Produkten von Weather News Inc. (WNI).
Durch die geringe Teilnehmerzahl war es leider nur wenigen Mitglieder möglich, den interessanten Ausführungen zu folgen. Wir werden jedoch Versuchen die Vorträge in Schriftform auf der DFV Internetseite zum Download zur Verfügung zu stellen.

Im Protokoll möchte ich besonders auf den Punkt 07.) aufmerksam machen, dort finden Sie den Termin für das diesjährige IFALDA / EUFALDA Meeting in Kuala Lumpur sowie einen Termin für die Besichtigung der Deutschen Flugsicherung in Langen. Ich bitte die angegebenen Fristen aus organisatorischen Gründen einzuhalten.

An dieser Stelle möchte ich alle Mitglieder darum bitten, bei Änderungen der persönlichen Daten (Anschrift, Kontoverbindung, Übergang von Arbeitnehmer zu Rentner, usw.) eine entsprechende Mitteilung an Raik Hembus zu schicken.

Im Namen der Deutschen Flugdienstberater Vereinigung möchte ich mich bei Florian Schellschmidt für die geleistete Arbeit als 1. Vorsitzender, sowie bei Sascha Neusser als Referent Öffentlichkeitsarbeit bedanken und verbleibe

mit freundlichen Grüßen

Axel Ostertag

# Protokoll zur DFV Jahreshauptversammlung 2006

Die Jahreshauptversammlung fand am 02.03.2006 im Hotel Lindenhof in Kelsterbach statt.

## 01.) Begrüßung und Feststellung der Anwesenden

Die Anwesenden wurden um 19:15 Uhr durch den 1. Vorsitzenden Florian Schellschmidt begrüßt. Anwesenheit entsprechend beiliegender Anwesenheitsliste, alle Anwesenden stellten sich der Reihe nach vor.
Die Vorstandsmitglieder Raik Hembus und Sascha Neusser können leider nicht teilnehmen.

## 02.) Antrag auf Abstimmung nur auf Handzeichen

Dem Antrag auf Abstimmung nur auf Handzeichen, gestellt durch Reinhard Sydlik, wird einstimmig stattgegeben.

## 03.) Genehmigung der Tagesordnung

Die Tagesordnung wird von allen Anwesenden akzeptiert.

## 04.) Jahresbericht 2005

- Bericht des 1. Vorsitzenden: es wurde über das vergangene Jahr und die in 2005 abgehaltenen Meetings der EASA und einem Meeting zwischen dem LBA und Vertretern der Industrie zum Erhalt der deutschen Flugdienstberaterlizenz berichtet. Die Ergebnisse sind bereits durch die Mitgliederrundschreiben an die Mitglieder weitergegeben worden.
  Des Weiteren wurde ein Brief von Alan Rossmore, President der IFALDA, vorgestellt, welcher sich an die ICAO richtet und die Notwendigkeit einer Lizenz verdeutlichen soll. Eine Kopie des Briefes befindet sich im Anhang.
- Stand Mitgliederzahlen: derzeit hat die DFV 106 Mitglieder
- Website: da der Internetauftritt der DFV nicht mehr zeitgemäß ist, wird dieser überarbeitet und soll noch in diesem Jahr mit neuem Design online gehen.
- Reiseregelung: durch den Vorstand wurde eine Anpassung zur Reiseregelung beschlossen. Mitglieder müssen nun mindestens ein Jahr lang Mitglied in der DFV sein, bevor sie eine Bezuschussung zu den Reisekosten bekommen. Des Weiteren sollen zukünftig von den Mitgliedern, die zu den EUFALDA / IFALDA Meetings gehen, Protokolle zu den Fachvorträgen erstellt werden, nicht wie bisher zu den eigentlichen Versammlungen. Hier wird auf die offiziellen Protokolle gewartet.
- Zukünftig wird wieder intensiv mit der Lufthansa Flight Training bei der Erstellung eines Lernzielkatalogs zur Ausbildung von Flugdienstberatern zusammengearbeitet.

## 05.) Kassenbericht des Geschäftjahres 2005 / Entlastung des Vorstandes

Der Kassenbericht für das Jahr 2005 wurde von Jan-Philipp Lauer (LH) und Christoph Flubacher (LH) geprüft, das Ergebnis wurde von Florian Schellschmidt den Anwesenden gezeigt. Durch ein Überschuss von 1360 € im Jahr 2005, wird das Reisekostenbudget für das Jahr 2006 aufgestockt, da für das IFALDA/EUFALDA Meeting in Kuala Lumpur mit etwas höheren Kosten als bisher gerechnet wird.
Der ausführliche Kassenbericht kann beim Vorstand eingesehen werden.
Der Antrag auf Entlastung des Vorstandes durch Egon Philippi wurde einstimmig angenommen.

06.) Vorstandswahlen 2006

Zur Wahl wurden folgende Personen vorgeschlagen:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Vorsitzender | → | Axel Ostertag | einstimmig |
| 2. Vorsitzender | → | Hein Ruiter | einstimmig |
| Ref. Verwaltung | → | Raik Hembus | einstimmig |
| Ref. Fachlich Information | → | Bernhard Lüdtke | einstimmig |
| Ref. Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | → | N.N. | |

Alle Vorgeschlagenen Personen wurden einstimmig von den anwesenden Mitgliedern gewählt, die Position für die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit bleibt bis zu der nächsten Wahl unbesetzt.
Alle gewählten Mitglieder haben die Wahl angenommen.

07.) IFALDA/EUFALDA AGM Malaysia Mai 2006 / Besuch der Deutschen Flugsicherung

Vom 08. bis 12. Mai findet in Kuala Lumpur das diesjährige Meeting der IFALDA und EUFALDA statt. Interessierte Mitglieder wenden sich bitte bis zum 01. April beim 1. Vorsitzenden (axel.ostertag@lido.net) um eine evtl. notwendige Aufteilung des Reisebudgets zu ermitteln. Nähere Informationen finden sich auch auf der IFALDA Internetseite www.ifalda.org.

Am 15. Mai findet für die DFV Mitglieder ein Besuch der Deutschen Flugsicherung in Langen statt, Beginn ist 15 Uhr. Da die Teilnehmeranzahl auf 15 begrenzt ist und die DFS entsprechende Besucherausweise anfertigen muss, bitten wir um eine **verbindliche** Anmeldung bis zum 01. Mai. Interessierte Mitglieder wenden sich bitte an den 2. Vorsitzenden Hein Ruiter (hein.ruiter@lido.net).

08.) 1. Fachvortrag

Von der Vereinigung Cockpit wurde Herr Nikolaus Braun begrüßt, welcher einen Vortrag zum A380 hielt. Es wurde dabei auf die neuen Dimensionen sowie operationelle Schwierigkeiten eingegangen. Die Präsentation soll den Mitgliedern zum Download auf der Internetseite zur Verfügung gestellt werden.

09.) 2. Fachvortrag

Die Gäste von Weather News Incorporation (WNI) stellten die von ihnen angebotenen Produkte und Serviceleistungen vor.

Der Vorstand bedankte sich bei allen Gästen fürs Kommen und die Vorträge.

10.) Verschiedenes

NIL

Die Sitzung wurde um 22:15 Uhr beendet, der Vorstand bedankte sich bei allen Anwesenden für die Teilnahme.

Kelsterbach, den 02.03.2006

Florian Schellschmidt Hein Ruiter Axel Ostertag (Protokollant)

Remarks To
The International Civil Aviation Organization
Air Navigation Commission
January 26, 2006

Allan Rossmore, President
Adrian Sandziuk, Vice President, West

International Federation of Airline Dispatchers Associations

# "Easy Fruit"

Reference to State Letter AN11/44-05/61
Amendment to Annex 6 regarding Flight Dispatchers/Flight Operations Officers

Ladies and Gentlemen;

Thank you for the opportunity to participate here today. IFALDA is a global international organization, with thousands of members representing Flight Dispatchers/Flight Operations Officers worldwide. We have members in Europe, North America, South America, Asia and Africa.

As we look at recent history in the airline industry there have been great strides in safety. We have seen systems like GPS, Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems, glass cockpits, and head up displays make a significant contribution to air safety.

There are those who say that the system is at a plateau, that all of the easy fruit that will improve aviation safety has been picked. We disagree. There are significant holes in the systems that need to be plugged. One of those is, as we know, the African situation. But yet another exists and is an urgent need. That is the lack of effective airline operational control in many areas of the world.

The two basic functions of an airline operational control system are that of pre-flight planning and in-flight monitoring. These systems decide whether to initiate, cancel, delay or divert airline flights.

There are two opposing schools of thought regarding airline operational control in today's world. One which supports a full shared responsibility system, where the Flight Dispatcher/Flight Operations Officer (FOO) shares joint responsibility with the Pilot in Command (PIC) of the aircraft and the two agree on a course of action.

The other school of thought believes that the PIC should exercise operational control alone, as sole actor.

If we look at the lessons of history and human factors and safety, there is one clear lesson we have all learned. As good as the human being is, he/she is not perfect as an operator in a complex, technical system. We recognize that people can make errors in various ways. We try to prevent them from making mistakes by requiring checklists and procedures. By using autopilots and autoland systems. By designing cockpit layouts and displays that consider the human interface. By emphasizing cockpit resource management.

All of these have had a positive impact. But there remains a major problem. In many areas of the world, the flight crews are operating without a fundamental support system which would provide them with necessary operational information. They depart and fly on both short haul and long haul flights and the airline itself does not provide them with professional pre-flight planning or flight monitoring while the flight is enroute. Many airlines do not even know where their flights are because they do not track them. Nor do they monitor the conditions in which they are flying.

As a result, there have been many incidents or accidents that relate to the lack of an effective operational control system.

- *Airline "A' Boeing B737, from AAA, to BBB, December 1999, encountered severe weather, had outdated weather information, destination and alternates closed; diverted with a fuel emergency, landing in CCC, Denmark with 70 knot winds. If it had had to make another go around, it likely would have run out of fuel.*
- *Airline "B" Airbus A310, from DDD to EEE, Germany, July 2000, experienced aircraft system failure (landing gear unable to retract), flight continued, misjudgment by crew bypassing a number of suitable airports, using incorrect fuel consumption data, resulting in fuel exhaustion as it was attempting to land at FFF. The aircraft crashed and was destroyed.*

- *Airline 'C" SAAB 2000 from GGG, Switzerland to HHH, July 2002, encountered severe weather, destination and alternates closed, fuel exhaustion, attempted landing at a closed airport at night at JJJ. Aircraft destroyed. The aircraft was vectored directly into the severe weather by ATC.*
- *Airline "D" Airbus A321, Over Germany, May, 2003, encountered severe weather/ hail, serious damage, aircraft continued for hundreds of kilometers to KKK, England before landing in spite of numerous suitable airports along the route. Apparently, the crew had turned off the weather radar several hours prior to hitting the hailstorm.*
- *Airline "E" Boeing B737 LLL, Switzerland, August, 2003, encountered severe weather/hail, serious damage.*
- *Airline "F" Airbus A330, from MMM, USA to NNN, Sweden, October, 2003, continued with no holding fuel into low visibility/missed approach at destination, insufficient fuel for a legal alternate; diverted to PPP with a fuel emergency. The crew did not monitor the fuel consumption or the destination and alternate weather while enroute.*
- *Airline "G" Boeing 747-400 flight from RRR, USA to SSS, UK in February 2005 experienced an engine surge just after takeoff at RRR and the engine was shut down. The flight crew, with advice from the airline's maintenance and operations office in SSS, elected to continue on across the US and Canada, and across the North Atlantic for 11 hours with only 3 engines operating and subsequently declared an emergency due to a fuel problem and landed short of SSS in TTT. European authorities indicate that according to them this incident and the decisions that were made were within the applicable regulations.*
- *Airline "H" A340-600 in February, 2005, from TTT to UUU, experienced problems with its computerized fuel management systems, where both fuel control computer systems failed, resulting in first the #1 engine failing for fuel starvation over the Netherlands, after which the crew intended to continue to SSS, although the crew suspected a fuel leak, yet soon after, the #4 engine also spooled down for fuel starvation, after which the crew declared an emergency and landed in VVV.*
- *On October 22, 2005, another airline "G" A319 departed SSS for XXX at night, and during the climb, still close to RRR, experienced a major electrical failure where five of six of the cockpit displays went dark for several minutes. The crew also lost radio communications with ATC and were unable to transmit a mayday call. They regained communications and some systems and held for 40 minutes near SSS to check the aircraft systems and then elected to continue to XXX rather than returning to SSS.*

An effective, shared system of operational control could have prevented all of these accidents and incidents. They can prevent two basic types of errors. Poor information and poor judgment. The certified, properly trained Flight Dispatcher/FOO can plan a flight safely and can support the flight crew when they have a problem in flight. They can anticipate problems and give the crews advance warning of potential problems. All of this is well proven since the 1930s. They are a human factors double check on critical areas of safety. This requires certification of Flight Dispatchers/Flight Operations Officers, effective training, proper communications systems, and appropriate regulations and oversight. But the benefits are significant. It is easy fruit.

How effective is it? North America uses the shared system, Europe does not. If one compares the US/Canadian shared system with that of Europe, there is a significant difference in safety statistics. Per ICAO from 2000-2004 the fatality rate of North America versus Europe was 0.4 per million departures for North America, versus Europe at 0.6 per million departures. According to IATA, for the year 2004, the hull loss rate per million departures for western built jets in North America was 0.29. For Europe it was 0.52. Almost double in Europe versus the North America. It is even more remarkable when one considers the financial pressures that carriers in the US, in particular, are under financially. More than half the system has been operating under bankruptcy. Yet in spite of this, it has maintained its safety. Both Europe and the US/Canada use similar technologies, and similar aircraft, although one could make the argument that Europe has younger fleets and that the US/Canada has more severe weather issues to deal with. This makes it even more significant.

Other states/countries have seen the benefits of the shared system. The Peoples Republic of China, the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia have all adopted this system.

Yet some have made the comment that they are perfectly ok with a sole system of operational control, as they are "finely honed". The PIC is it. The people who support the PIC are fragmented into several functions of weather, flight planning, load planning, maintenance and operations planning specialists. In most cases they have no flight monitoring whatsoever. They don't need "Flight Dispatchers/Flight Operations Officers". They say they don't need to centralize the function, so that all operational information goes through one point of contact with the crew, and information is not lost. They say they don't need to train that person so that he/she is knowledgeable and helpful when that person communicates with the crew. And they say they don't need licensing/certification of that person so that that person can be held accountable by the State of the Operator. And they certainly don't need responsibility and authority so that there is a true human factors

double check on safety decisions. They rely on automated flight planning systems, which simply are not capable of considering all factors in planning a flight.

Their philosophy is that of “the crew will find out about the problem when they get there”. That is a true statement. And sometimes they wind up in a very uncomfortable spot. In the meantime, the crews receive flight plans that plan flights directly into the eye of hurricanes. And crews make the statement that they have no “confidence” in their flight planning systems. No wonder. And they are on their own when they get into the air. ATC is neither equipped nor capable of giving them this information. This flies in the face of everything we know about human factors and decision making in aviation. To support this sole system, one has to assume that crews will always have the best information and that they will never make mistakes. It assumes perfection. Yet it specifically denies the crews the support they need to make better decisions. It is inherently in conflict with itself. It can never be as good as a shared system. Never.

If we were to follow this same philosophy in other areas of aviation, we would have single engine, single pilot operations as a norm. We would have no redundancy for flight control, electrical or hydraulic systems. And certainly no TCAS or CRM.

Security is another important issue in operational control. When 9/11 happened US and Canadian Flight Dispatchers/Flight Operations Officers were essential in getting information to their flight crews and getting the flights on the ground as quickly as possible. In many cases, the Flight Dispatchers took the initiative and grounded flights well before ATC reacted. On the other hand we have seen a number of flight intercepts in Europe where flights lost contact with ATC and interceptors were launched to investigate the aircraft as the crew was not responding. In the shared system, this would have been totally avoided, as the Flight Dispatcher/Flight Operations Officer with their own communications system could have communicated with the flight and had them contact ATC. But in Europe and many other areas, this would

simply be impossible, as airlines do not even feel the need to track their flights, much less communicate with them. There is no such system.

This situation of the lack of an effective operational control system in many areas reminds us of the history of the Concorde prior to its tragic accident. Their were a number of incidents which showed that the aircraft was vulnerable to tire failure and debris striking the engines and fuel tank areas, yet they were not taken seriously. We feel the same situation here. There is plenty of evidence that there is a problem, a hole in the system. It needs to be fixed or there will be consequences in the future. We are all actors in this system. The pilots, the maintenance people, ATC, ground operations, and yes, flight dispatch. And we all know one thing. That we all make mistakes.

That is why we are here today. To minimize those mistakes and errors that are life threatening. Not for the actors in the system. Not for the pilots, although we support them wholeheartedly. Not for the maintenance people, although we respect them greatly. Not for the ATC people with whom we work very closely. Not for the ground operations people who do a tough job in difficult conditions. We are here for the passenger. They are the ones who deserve a proper, effective operational control system. They put their trust in all of us to get them to their destination safely.

Do we support a shared system? Of course. (As if you couldn’t tell by now). Let us support you and make your operation as safe as it deserves to be. Let us minimize errors of bad or no information and poor judgment.

Do we support Flight Dispatcher/Flight Operations Officer certification/licensing? Yes. Make us accountable and responsible to the State. Every time we make a decision we will think about its ramifications and we will make the right one.

Do we support effective training for Flight Dispatchers/Flight Operations Officers? Yes, give us the knowledge and skill to help you at the highest level. Let us be able to support the crews credibly so they will have faith in our product.

Do we support a communication system separate from ATC? Yes, let us be able to monitor flights to give them critical safety information and interact with them whenever we or they need it.

Do we support a centralized function? Yes. Let us be one integrated person who can be the single point of contact with the crews, instead of fragmented and ignorant.

So, do we support this proposal regarding Flight Dispatch/Flight Operations Officers? Yes. It is a small but important step, which will help to centralize this important function and make it more effective with training. It does not require licensing/certification. It does not require joint/shared responsibility. But we want to

complement the United States for putting forth this proposal. If adopted, it will make a significant improvement in aviation safety.

It is easy fruit. And it will help avoid future tragedies. No more running out fuel, or into bad weather or continuing with seriously degraded aircraft. No more. And no more airlines not even knowing where their flights are. No more. This doesn't solve all of those problems, but it is an important step toward that goal.

Thank You.